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Abstract
Longevity risk, which is typically portrayed as the problem of people outliving their assets, can be viewed
as both an aggregate and an individual-level issue. A related issue is that of ‘active life,’ an individual-level
phenomenon, or ‘active life expectancy’ (ALE), an aggregate phenomenon. During their lifetimes,
members of a covered population may alternate between ‘active’ and ‘disabled’ status; the average
amount of time spent in the ‘active’ state is, for the cohort, its ‘active life expectancy.’ ALE does not appear
to have consequences for aggregate longevity risk, but it may have major implications at the individual
level. A transition from active to disabled status may signal a shorter-than-expected remaining lifetime,
with implications for the speed at which one should draw down one’s assets. Moreover, those with severe
care needs but lacking access to family-provided care and long-term care insurance may find that they
need to draw down their assets in order to achieve eligibility for Medicaid-funded care services. Indeed,
Medicaid and family-provided elder care can be viewed as a particular form of ‘public-private partnership’
for sharing the risks of late-life care needs.
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Chapter 3

Disability-free Life Trends at Older Ages
Implications for Longevity Risk Management
Douglas A. Wolf

Longevity risk is typically defined as the problem of people living longer
than expected. From an aggregate perspective, for example the one adopted by a pension fund manager, increasing life expectancy—that is, an
increase in the average age at death of a covered population—implies that
financial reserves may be inadequate to meet payment obligations. From an
individual perspective, the problem is one of ‘outliving one’s assets,’ but that
problem can arise from having too few assets as well as from living longer
than anticipated. The aggregate form of longevity risk is sometimes characterized as one associated with the uncertainty attached to future lifetimes,
rather than simply the length of future lifetimes (e.g. Brouhns et al. 2002;
de Waegenaere et al. 2010). The present chapter is concerned primarily
with the length, rather than the variability, of remaining lifetimes.
At its core, longevity risk involves two dimensions: the level of assets, from
which an income stream is to be generated, and the length of remaining life,
which defines the period of time for which the income stream is needed.
This chapter explores the possible role for a third dimension of the problem of longevity risk, namely the role of active (or ‘disability-free’) life—an
individual-level phenomenon—and active life expectancy (ALE), which is
an aggregate or cohort-level phenomenon. An individual’s ‘active’ status
can change during her or his lifetime, and it can improve as well as worsen
(Wolf et al. 2007). Thus, during a person’s remaining lifetime, the total period of time spent disabled (or, in the complementary active state) can be
viewed as a random variable whose values range from zero to the entirety of
remaining life.
ALE is defined as the average of the individual-level random variable
‘cumulative time spent without disability’ (or ‘total active life’), and it can
refer to either an actual population (i.e. a cohort) or an artificial population
(e.g. in period terms). Nevertheless, there appear to be no available data
that record the entirety (and few that record even a portion) of the process
Douglas A. Wolf, Disability-free Life Trends at Older Ages.
In: New Models for Managing Longevity Risk. Edited by Olivia S. Mitchell, Oxford University Press.
© Pension Research Council (2022). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192859808.003.0003

Disability-free Life Trends at Older Ages

35

through which time spent with (or without) a disability steadily accumulates
during individuals’ lives. The most common form of individual-level longitudinal data on disabled or disability-free status presents a series of biannual
(or in some cases annual) snapshots of individuals’ statuses. An exception
is the National Health and Aging Trends Study (NHATS), which includes
monthly measures of respondents’ receipt of help from others with personalcare tasks (such as eating, bathing, and dressing) and mobility-related tasks
(such as getting into or out of bed) (Freedman et al. 2015). But to date, at
most eight years of these monthly indicators can be produced using available NHATS public-use data, limiting its usefulness in characterizing the full
picture of active status from age 65 to death. Instead, a large and vigorous
literature has developed to produce estimates of ALE despite an absence of
individual-level data on the length of active life, the phenomenon for which
ALE is the supposed average (Imai and Soneji 2007; Laditka and Laditka
2009).
In what follows, we first review trends in life expectancy and ALE—
aggregate-level phenomena, in both cases—and consider the implications
of ALE for longevity risk. The section concludes that ALE trends add little
or nothing to the understanding of aggregate longevity risk. The second
section of the chapter turns to the individual perspective on longevity risk,
considering the implications of active life—or alternatively, life spent with
a disability—for longevity risk. Within the constraints imposed by data limitations noted above, we conclude that there are very striking implications
of disability status for longevity risk, although given the complexity of the
situation revealed by the data, clear-cut behavioral rules based on these findings are not evident. In a brief final section, we discuss interactions between
public and private responses to disability late in life.

Trends in Life Expectancy and Active Life
Expectancy
It is a well-known fact that period life expectancy has been increasing from
year to year—with a handful of exceptions—for many decades. Although
the available evidence is more limited, it suggests that ALE has been
increasing in recent years as well.
While there are large differences in life expectancy by sex, race, and other
background characteristics, for simplicity’s sake I will limit attention mainly to both sexes/all races data. Moreover, given the focus of this chapter
on longevity risk in retirement, I will limit attention to life expectancy at
age 65. Figure 3.1 plots life expectancy as computed by the National Center for Health Statistics for the period 1950 to 2018 (Figure 3.1 also shows
estimates of ALE from several sources, as described below). Despite the
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Figure 3.1 Trends in total and active lifetime at age 65
Sources: National Center for Health Statistics (2018) (NCHS); HRS (2019), author’s calculations; Manton et al. (2006) (MGL); Cai and Lubitz (2007) (CL); Chernew et al. (2016)
(CCGL).

existence of several brief periods of decline, the predominant pattern for
life expectancy is clearly one of improvement during this period. A recent
analysis of death rates—the inputs into computation of life expectancy—for
roughly the same period (1969–2013) found statistically significant ‘break
points’ in the trend line for overall mortality in 1978, 2002, and 2010 (Ma
et al. 2015). The downward trend in overall mortality continued, but its
slope changed somewhat, at each such breakpoint. An analogous pattern
can be seen in the pattern for life expectancy at age 65 in Figure 3.1.
The more-or-less regular trend of increasing period life expectancy over
a nearly 70-year period would seem to suggest that pension fund managers
could develop forecasting tools that anticipate and therefore eliminate the
problem of longevity risk. Moreover, the slowdown—and apparent cessation, since 2014—of the trend toward growing life expectancy at age 65
might, in turn, imply that the problem of longevity risk could diminish on
its own.
Turning from life expectancy, defined by the unambiguous and irreversible transition from living to dead, to ALE, defined by a partitioning of
remaining life years into those spent with or without disability, introduces
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several complexities into the analysis. Formally, ALE is the area under a survival curve that is multiplied by the proportion ‘active’ at each age (Imai
and Soneji 2007). In practice, calculating period ALE using the most widely
used technique, the so-called ‘Sullivan’ method, is simple: the calculations
entail multiplying elements of the person-years-lived column of a life table
by the corresponding elements of an array of age-specific disability (or
non-disability) prevalence rates. The great majority of applications of this
approach use a binary distinction between ‘disabled’ and ‘disability-free’
(or ‘healthy’ versus ‘unhealthy,’ or ‘active’ versus ‘inactive,’ or any number
of other health- or functioning-related categories).
A large literature devoted to ALE has developed since the early contributions of Sullivan (1971) and Katz et al. (1983), and this literature supplies
many and varied estimates for ALE. One reason for the proliferation of
ALE estimates is the variety of measures of ‘active’ status that have been
used—the distinction between ‘disabled’ and ‘disability-free’ is not nearly as straightforward, in concept or measure, as is the distinction between
‘alive’ and ‘dead.’ For this chapter, I have produced a series of period ALE
estimates for 1998, 2000 . . ., 2016 using disability measures from the US
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in combination with life tables published by the National Center for Health Statistics. The HRS is an ongoing
large-scale population-based panel survey that began in 1992, employing
biennial surveys thereafter. While the initial sample was limited to the noninstitutionalized population age 51–61, various additions to the sample
since then permit me to compute ALE estimates for 65-year-olds beginning
in 1998 (Health and Retirement Study 2019). The disability measures used
here are binary indicators of whether the sample person receives help from
another person with any of six Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), namely
eating, dressing, toileting, bathing, getting in or out of bed, and walking.
Getting help from another person for a basic personal-care task such as
these corresponds to a conceptualization of ‘disability as dependency’; it
is useful in a discussion of longevity risk because help from others entails
the use of concrete resources—time or money—and therefore has implications for financial well-being. The ADL indicators used here are taken from
a public-use file produced by the RAND Corporation (Bugliari et al. 2019a).
The ALE calculations use the abridged life table setup found in Jagger et al.
(2014), which implements the Sullivan method for calculating period ALE.
Age-specific disability prevalence rates based on the HRS variables are
plotted in Figure 3.2. There are no apparent trends over this 18-year period
among the two youngest age groups (65–74 and 80–84), ages at which disability prevalence rates are quite low. Among the older age groups (85–94
and 95+) the trends are not uniform throughout the period, but they are
clearly predominantly downward, ending (in 2016) well below their initial
values (in 1998).
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Figure 3.2 Trends in disability prevalence by age group, 1998–2016
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Health and Retirement Study (2019).

The 1998–2016 HRS-based calculations of ALE are plotted, along with
analogous points taken from three previous publications, in Figure 3.1. All
the ALE estimates shown in Figure 3.1 pertain, like the total life-expectancy
figures, to the total population; in addition, most also use the Sullivan
method. Differences in levels across sources derive principally from the different criteria used to distinguish the ‘disabled’ from the ‘disability-free’
portion of the population. Crimmins et al. (2016), for example, define the
‘active’ population as those free of any limitation of activities, which is the
broadest definition used among the sources shown here; this definition, in
turn, produces the lowest estimates of ALE. My ‘disability as dependency’
definition is, in contrast, the most restrictive, and in turn produces the
highest estimates of ALE. The other data points plotted in Figure 3.1 use disability criteria that fall between these two extremes. Cai and Lubitz (2007)
use the criterion having difficulty performing either ADL or Instrumental
ADL (e.g. shopping, meal preparation) tasks to define having a disability.
Manton et al. (2006) use measures based on the National Long Term Care
Survey data, which count as disabled those getting help from other people, along with those using special equipment, to perform daily tasks, and
also include those with unmet needs for help dealing with health-related
difficulties performing daily tasks.
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Figure 3.1 reveals a strikingly consistent pattern of improvement in ALE
at age 65 over time. While the levels of ALE differ by the criteria used
to measure disability, changes over time in ALE based on each of these
measures are close to parallel. Demographers and gerontologists are also
interested in the ‘compression of morbidity,’ a phenomenon associated with
the percentage of remaining lifetime lived in a disabled state (Cai and Lubitz 2007). With respect to morbidity compression, however, the estimates
shown in Figure 3.1 are unclear: when converted to percentages of total life
expectancy (not shown), none of the four ALE series plotted in Figure 3.1
shows a clear trend.

Implications for longevity risk
ALE appears to be closely tied to longevity: Figure 3.1 shows that trends in
ALE tend to parallel the trend in life expectancy. But whatever the trends
in ALE—examined in isolation or relative to total life expectancy—these
trends most likely have little or no relevance for aggregate longevity risk.
The payout obligations of a pension fund are usually unchanged by the disability status of its beneficiaries. Researchers have pointed out that common
factors contribute to improvements in both total life expectancy and ALE
(Chernew et al. 2016; Stallard 2016), suggesting that once such factors are
incorporated into a mortality forecast, the level or trend in ALE should not
add anything to the determination of longevity risk. In other words, whereas ALE is surely associated with the quality of life of pensioners, it seems to
have no bearing on the longevity risk faced by pension fund managers.

Active Life and Individual Longevity Risk
In what follows, we discuss individual-level longevity risk from the vantage
point of a 65-year-old person, that is, someone close to the typical US age
of retirement. At that point, an individual has a given level of assets but
faces an uncertain remaining lifetime. If the longevity risk issue is expressed
narrowly as the risk of outliving one’s assets, then the decision problem
facing this individual can be factored into two parts: first, one must—at
least implicitly—form an expectation regarding the number of life years
that remain; and second, conditional on the first, one must decide either to
annuitize assets or to draw them down, presumably following a careful and
well-informed plan. The ‘annuitize’ option, in turn, can be further subdivided into one of buying a fixed-term (usually 10- or 15-year) income stream
or buying a lifelong income stream.1
With a fixed-term annuity, considerable longevity risk is likely to remain;
in contrast, a whole-life annuity eliminates longevity risk but does so at the
cost of providing a notably smaller income stream during one’s remaining
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lifetime. Introducing ‘active lifetime’ as a third factor adds yet another
domain of uncertainty into the analysis. A fourth dimension of economic
well-being during retirement is, of course, the size of one’s social security
benefit (for the over 95% of the 65+ population that do, or ultimately will,
receive a benefit; Whitman et al. 2011). Although the social security system
is subject to political forces and is therefore not immune to adjustment, it is
nominally an asset that cannot be outlived; we largely ignore social security
in what follows.
We address the dimensions of longevity, wealth, and disability using data
from the 1998–2016 HRS, discussed earlier. To the ‘disability’ indicator
already described, we add a measure of the net value of nonhousing wealth,
also available in a public-use data file produced by the RAND Corporation
(Bugliari et al. 2019b). We also adopt a cohort perspective, focusing on individuals age 65 (or 66) during any of the 1998–2016 interviews, and who were
followed thereafter until lost to death or attrition from the sample by the
last observation in 2016.2 This limits the analysis, inasmuch as the maximum
age to which surviving members of these biannual cohorts can be followed
is 84.
Nevertheless, the most limiting feature of the data used here is the
use of biennial indicators of current disability status (i.e. getting help
from another person with one or more ADL tasks) as a proxy for continuous but possibly interrupted episodes of disability. At most, we can
observe up to 10 biennia—baseline plus follow-up—within the continuously observed cohort subsample, and thereby obtain a partial measure of cumulative (in)active life over the follow-up period. Whether
this measure understates or overstates the underlying, but unobserved,
continuous active-years measure cannot be determined. If two consecutive HRS interviews are coded ‘disabled,’ the sample individual cannot
be assumed to have been continuously disabled for two years (Wolf and
Gill 2008). Similarly, if both of two successive interviews reveal someone to be disability-free at the time of the interview, we cannot assume
that the person remained disability-free throughout the interval between
interviews.
Moreover, by initiating the observation at age 65, we understate the lifetime experience of disability by an unknown amount: someone coded as
disabled at age 65 has been in that state for an unknown period of time,
and someone coded as disability-free at age 65 may have had a period with
disability that ended at an earlier age. Finally, episodes of disability are right
censored by death, given that death and accumulating life years with disability are semi-competing risks: an episode of having a disability can be censored
by the event of death, but the reverse is not true (Varadhan et al. 2014). Subject to these data limitations, I report on three relevant random variables:
survivorship from age 65, the level of assets held at age 65, and the period
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of life spent disabled, or free of disability, from age 65 onward. We first consider the marginal distribution of each variable in isolation, and then we
consider some relevant associations among them.

Remaining lifetime at age 65
Period-based data on years of remaining life are readily available from conventional life tables. Based on the US period life table for 2007, the midpoint
of the years spanned by the HRS sample, life expectancy at age 65 was 18.6
years (Arias 2011). Thus, average remaining lifetime for 65-year-olds slightly exceeded the 18-year follow-up period allowed in the HRS sample used
here. Consequently, there is a great deal of censoring of age at death in the
cohort sample. Moreover, as is well known, there is a great deal of variability
in remaining lifetime (Edwards 2011). For example, the standard deviation
of remaining lifetime at age 65, again based on the 2007 period life table
for the full US population, was 8.8 years.
The substantial variability in the length of remaining lifetime underscores the challenges people face in deciding how to manage whatever
assets they have at the time of retirement. Even if people could do a good
job of forecasting the mean of their years-of-remaining-life distribution,
there would remain a sizeable probability that they would underestimate
the chances of living substantially longer than expected. More problematic, however, is the possibility of bias in people’s forecasts of anticipated
remaining lifetime. Perozek’s (2008) analysis of HRS respondents’ answers
to survey questions regarding their beliefs about the chances that they will
live to age 75, and to age 85, imply survival probabilities that are reasonably accurate for men, but understated for women. Such biases might, in
turn, imply that women would tend to draw down their retirement-age assets
too quickly. Similar findings appear in McGarry (2022) (Chapter 2, this volume), who additionally demonstrates that HRS respondents tend to adjust
downwards their subjective survival probabilities in response to the experience of a serious health shock such as a stroke, the occurrence of heart
problems, or receiving a cancer diagnosis.

Assets at age 65
There is a great deal of inequality in wealth holdings in the population
generally, and this inequality persists into retirement years (Poterba et al.
2018; Eggelston and Munk 2019). Table 3.1 presents several indicators of
the distribution of nonhousing wealth at age 65 in the HRS sample. These
indicators are based on a pooled sample of people age 65 or 66 in 1998,
2000. . ., 2016, with wealth values expressed in 2019 dollars. The 2008–2009
years of the global financial crisis are included in this pooled sample, which
undoubtedly distorts the wealth picture to some degree. Also, household
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Table 3.1 Net nonhousing wealth for 65-year-old HRS respondents, 1998–2016
All
Mean
$104,156
Median
$6,950
20th percentile
$0
40th percentile
$1,972
60th percentile
$17,850
80th percentile
$90,200
Given annual rate of return of
2%
percentage with wealth sufficient to buy an annuity providing . . .
. . . mean annual income . . .
. . . for 10 years
5.1%
. . . for 15 years
3.2%
. . . for life
2.1%
. . . mean annual income less social security . . .
. . . for 10 years
11.3%
. . . for 15 years
8.1%
. . . for life
5.6%

With positive wealth

4%

$144,489
$25,200
$2,880
$13,755
$44,640
$146,300
6%

5.6%
3.8%
2.7%

6.2%
4.4%
3.3%

12.4%
9.2%
7.2%

13.3%
10.4%
9.6%

Notes:
a
Annuity pricing data provided by Benny Goodman of TIAA. These calculations are all based on
annuity pricing data from pre-Covid-19 crisis times; the public health and financial situations
of early 2020 have led to big changes in the demand for, the supply of, and the pricing of
retirement annuities.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Health and Retirement Study (2019).

wealth has been divided by two for married individuals; this may understate
people’s claims on wealth in the case of an emergency, but it may be
reasonably close to what would be available for annuitization.
Confirming results in other studies, Table 3.1 shows that, on average,
financial assets at the threshold of retirement are quite low and the distribution of those assets is extremely skewed. Nearly 28 percent of 65-year-olds
have negative or zero net assets, and among all 65-year-olds, the average
holdings are only $104,156. The median, however, is much lower, $6,950
(the maximum wealth in this sample, not shown in Table 3.1, is over $20
million).
The income streams potentially generated by these wealth holdings
would be modest for a great majority of the population. To illustrate this
point, Table 3.1 shows the percentage of the age 65 population with wealth
sufficient to purchase an annuity that would generate an annual income
equal to the population average for this age group, or—more realistically—
an average income beyond what is provided by social security on average.
For example, Census Bureau data tell us that the average annual income in
2018 of people age 65–74 was $46,325 (US Census Bureau 2019). The average monthly social security benefit among all retired workers age 65–69 in
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December 2017 was $1,926 (Social Security Administration 2019), implying an annual benefit of $23,106. Using prototypical annuity pricing, for
$100,000 one could purchase a 10-year annuity that, in 2019, generates
$917.81 per month, assuming a 2 percent rate of return on the assets
used to buy the annuity. Based on these figures, one would have needed
$420,601 to buy an annuity sufficient to produce annual income equal to
the average annual total income received by individuals in 2018. More realistically, a smaller amount—$193,790—would buy a 10-year annuity that
generates income equal to the difference between average total income and
average social security income, i.e. to ‘top off’ one’s social security benefit. Yet, according to Table 3.1, only 11.3 percent of the age 65 population
has enough financial wealth to buy even the smaller annuity. For those
with substantial housing wealth and both the ability and willingness to
‘downsize,’ housing assets could be sold, adding to their annuity purchasing power, but doing so would entail incurring transaction and moving
costs. To ensure that one will not outlive one’s assets, a whole-life annuity is
required, but as Table 3.1 makes clear, only a very small percentage of elders
have sufficient assets to achieve an average retirement income using this
strategy.
With respect to longevity risk, the main message from Table 3.1—which
examines only the asset component of the issue—is that regardless of how
long people expect they will live, the great majority of 65-year-olds have
either already outlived their assets or they will soon do so. Moreover, any
assets they do own will, at best, provide only a modest increment to their
social security income. However, the importance of social security to retirees
is well documented. For example, one recent study found that roughly half
of the aged population lives in households that receive at least 50 percent of
their total income from social security, while about one-quarter of the aged
live in households that receive at least 90 percent of their family income
from social security (Dushi et al. 2017). The data presented in Table 3.1
underscore the fact that the great majority of the population is ill-equipped
to achieve a retirement income that is much larger than their social security
benefit.

Years of active life
As explained earlier, empirical measurement of years of active life at the
individual level is difficult using available survey data. Continuous measures
of cumulative time spent disabled do not exist, and the limited time periods
covered by most panel surveys place restrictions on the part of the life cycle
that can be observed. Using the HRS measures and cohort sample previously described, we can examine the age profile of current and cumulative
(since 65) biennial indicators of disability. In order to accurately portray the
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distribution of years of active life beginning at age 65, it would be necessary
to model it as a random variable subject to censoring by death; moreover, it
would be desirable to build into that model the likely correlation between
the two outcomes. That exercise, however, is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, I present simple descriptive information on the age profile
of disability status among survivors at each age within the age 65 cohort
subsample taken from the HRS.
Figure 3.3 shows three age profiles. For each, the data points plotted
represent the average in each biennial survey (1998, 2000. . ., 2016) of age
at each biennial measurement and (a) the prevalence—that is, the current
value—of the disability indicator; (b) the cumulative incidence, during the
follow-up period, of the disability indicator; and (c) the total number of
biennia for which an individual is coded as ‘disabled,’ during the follow-up
period. These profiles are, of necessity, limited to survivors at each followup interview and limited to those for whom complete measurements (from
the interview in which they were age 65 or 66) to the present are available.
The most that someone can be tracked using this cohort design is 10 waves.
Therefore, while the origin of each line includes people age 65 or 66 in
all 10 interviews, the second data point is limited to those age 65 or 66 in
1998–2014 and still alive two years later; the tenth and final data point on
each line is limited to those age 65 or 66 in 1998 and still alive to respond
to the 2016 interview.
Figure 3.3 plots current and cumulative disability patterns from age 65
to roughly the mean age at death—about 84—of survivors, and thus misses
the ages where the risk of becoming or remaining disabled are highest (cf.
Figure 3.2). The current-prevalence figures rise from about six percent at
age 65 to nearly 20 percent at age 84; the cumulative-incidence curve (representing those ‘ever disabled’ starting with age 65) is only modestly higher,
consistent with some degree of recovery among those previously disabled.
The average number of biennia with disability curve is well above the other
two, but even it suggests only modest ‘lifetime’ (since age 65) experience
with disability among survivors to age 84. Not shown in this figure is the
fact that among survivors to the 10th biennial interview, nearly 77 percent
have never been coded ‘disabled.’ Thus, the available (and admittedly limited) information presented here suggests that whatever the implications of
active life years are for longevity risk, those implications are manifested for
only a minority of the population.
The preceding paragraphs have considered each of three dimensions of
the longevity risk issue—years of total life, level of assets, and years of active
life—in isolation. However, it is likely that these dimensions are associated,
so we now turn to a consideration of selected pairwise associations of these
dimensions. The analyses undertaken here are intended to be exploratory,
not comprehensive.
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Figure 3.3 Presence of disability by age, HRS respondents, 1998–2016
Note: ‘Current prevalence’ is the percentage of respondents reporting a disability at the time
of interview; ‘Cumulative incidence’ is the percentage of respondents that have reported a
disability at the time of interview or at an earlier interview; ‘Cumulative experience’ is the
average number of interviews, beginning at age 65, at which disability has been reported.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Health and Retirement Study (2019).

Wealth predicts longevity
Income has been shown to be strongly associated with longevity (Chetty
et al. 2016), and it is to be expected that wealth will have a similar association. To assess the role of wealth at age 65 as a predictor of remaining life
years, we estimated a censored regression (i.e. Tobit) model using a pooled
sample of individuals observed to be 65 or 66 in 1998. . . 2016 (n = 11,478).
As explained before, these individuals are followed for up to nine subsequent biennial interviews, at which time their remaining lifetime is right
censored. Others—albeit only a small minority, about 21 percent—are
observed to die during the follow-up period. The dependent variable in
this regression is the log of survival time. Wealth at age 65 is represented
as a categorical variable, with categories corresponding to the quintiles of
wealth given that it is positive (those with negative or zero net wealth represented the reference group). The results of this simple bivariate regression
are illustrated in Table 3.2. As shown in the table, zero-wealth age 65 individuals are expected to live only 11 more years, while those in each successive
quintile of positive net wealth have longer average lifetimes, up to a maximum of 15.5 years for those in the top wealth quintile. Other than for
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Table 3.2 Remaining lifetime at age 65, by wealth at age 65

Average remaining lifetime (years)

Zero
wealth

Quintile of positive wealth:
First Second Third Fourth

Fifth

11.0

11.6

15.5

13.5

14.2

15.1

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Health and Retirement Study (2019).

the difference between zero-wealth and first-quintile individuals, all the
other longevity differences shown in the table correspond to statistically
significant regression coefficients (with p < 0.0001).

Wealth is associated with reduced chances of becoming
disabled
Just as wealth is positively associated with longevity, it is expected to be associated with a longer life free of disability. To test this hypothesis, we created
a pooled sample of person-biennia observations for the HRS cohort sample.
Each of the 11,478 baseline individuals used in the preceding analysis are
now represented in the analysis sample for as many biennia that they remain
alive; the pooled sample thus contains 51,993 observations. The analysis
consists of a random-effects logit model of disability prevalence (i.e. ‘having
a disability’ = 1) at each biennial interview, controlling for age, wealth quintile, and the lagged value of ‘cumulative number of biennia with disability.’
The latter variable is included because when it is equal to zero, the person has not yet experienced any disability, and thus the dependent variable
represents the initial onset of disability.
The results of this disability-onset model show the dramatic consequences of wealth as a protective factor against becoming disabled.
Figure 3.4 plots the key features of the results: for the ages shown (65–80),
the probability of disability onset rises rapidly among those with zero wealth,
and much more slowly for those in even the lowest quintile of positive wealth
(for the sake of simplicity we show only the first, third, and fifth positivewealth quintiles). The age profile of disability onset is particularly low for
those at the upper end of the wealth distribution: someone previously
disability-free at age 80, but with zero wealth at age 65, has a probability
of disability onset that is more than 15 times larger (with probability equal
to 0.156) than an otherwise comparable person who at age 65 was in the top
positive-wealth quintile (with probability of only 0.01).

Disability onset predicts reduced longevity
Finally, we consider the consequences of experiencing disability for
one’s anticipated remaining lifetime. For this we use the same pooled
person-biennium sample just described, but now adopt a random-effects
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Figure 3.4 Probability of onset of disability by age and wealth at age 65
Note: Heights of bars in this histogram represent the probabilities of first reporting having a
disability at each indicated age, for those with zero wealth at age 65 and those in the first, third,
and fifth quintiles of positive wealth at age 65.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Health and Retirement Study (2019).

Tobit model for remaining years of life at each interview. The controls for
disability experience include indicators of one, two, and three or more
cumulative biennia with disability; the reference group consists of those
with no experience of disability to date. For the reference group, shown
in the uppermost line in Figure 3.5, average remaining lifetime is about
15 years at age 65, dropping steadily at later ages (as it must). The most
dramatic differences shown in Figure 3.5 are between the disability-free
population and those who have, to date, experienced just one biennium of
disability (whether current or lagged). For example, a disability-free 65-yearold can expect to live nearly 15 more years, on average; however, someone
disabled at that age has a much lower expected remaining lifetime of just
nine years. The greater the cumulative experience of disability, the greater
the reduction in remaining lifetime, although each additional increment
to the number of biennia with disability produces a smaller reduction in
remaining lifetime than the one before. Finally, the differences in residual
life expectancy between disability classes narrow with age.3
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Figure 3.5 Average number of years of remaining lifetime, by current age and
duration of current episode of disability
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Health and Retirement Study (2019).

Longevity Risk, Late-Life Disability, and
Public-Private Collaboration
Public-private partnerships, a blanket term that encompasses a broad array
of institutional and contractual forms involving a diverse set of public
and private actors, have become a major presence in recent decades. It
is generally agreed that the sharing of risks across the public and private
sectors is a central consideration in these partnerships (Hodge and Greve
2007). With respect to individual-level longevity risk, construed here as outliving one’s financial assets, a spectrum of risk sharing arrangements can
be observed. A prospective retiree entitled to social security benefits but
without any additional private savings or other financial assets faces no
longevity risk—presuming the continued operation of the social security
program throughout her or his lifetime—thanks to the fact that this risk
has been fully transferred to the public sector. Social security is, in effect,
the ‘public option’ for sharing the risk of lack of retirement income. At
the other extreme, someone with a pool of financial assets and an intention to self-manage those assets, i.e. to draw them down in keeping with
some sort of financial plan, may indeed outlive their private assets, and
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end up dependent on social security. Private pension plans, and the regulatory apparatus governing them, represent intermediate points along this
spectrum of longevity risk.
Introducing active life—or, its complement, late-life disability—into the
longevity risk picture adds some interesting features. As shown above,
the onset of disability may signal a shorter-than-expected remaining lifetime, which might indicate that assets could be drawn down more rapidly
without raising one’s longevity risk. On the other hand, the onset of disability signals what might prove eventually to be a need for high-cost long-term
care services, which would in turn force the issue of drawing down one’s
assets more quickly than planned and raise one’s longevity risk.
For the disabled older population—defined here as those getting help
with everyday tasks—the primary source of help is unpaid family members,
or ‘informal caregivers.’ Johnson and Wiener (2006) using data from 2002
indicate that among those getting help, about 61 percent were communitydwelling individuals getting unpaid help only, while nearly 26 percent were
either nursing home residents or community-dwelling individuals receiving paid help only; the remaining 13 percent were community dwellers
receiving help from both paid and unpaid sources.
The help provided to disabled elders by family members—mainly by
their adult children—might otherwise generate large out-of-pocket costs;
family caregiving, in other words, may help avoid longevity risk. It also
may delay or completely avert high-cost institutional care (Van Houtven
and Norton 2004; Charles and Sevak 2005). By doing so, family caregiving might have as one of its consequences the preservation of bequeathable assets; it might, in other words, have positive implications for intergenerational patterns of longevity risk. Yet family caregiving is widely
understood to impose substantial costs on the individuals that provide
it, and on the families of which they are a part. For example, according to a 2014 survey about 60 percent of informal caregivers are, or
at one time while providing care were, employed (NAC/AARP 2015).
Alternatively—changing denominators—about 18 percent of the employed
population are simultaneously engaged in care provision (Wolf 2019).
Employed caregivers report a broad range of care-related costs, among
which are missing work, taking unpaid leave (and consequently lowering
income), changing to a lower paid or part-time job, or quitting work entirely
(Witters 2011; NAC/AARP 2015). Thus, there are good reasons to imagine that family caregiving has negative implications for intergenerational
patterns of longevity risk.
For those disabled elders whose care is provided in the community by
paid caregivers, or in nursing homes (and, therefore, necessarily by paid
caregivers), the majority of care costs are borne by Medicaid (Reaves and
Musumeci 2015). Paid care services are strongly connected to longevity risk,
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in view of the fact that eligibility for Medicaid depends in part on passing a
stringent asset test. Moreover, there is a great deal of state-to-state variation
in the stringency of the asset test: in 2018, for example, the level of allowable assets ranged from a low of $1,500 (in New Hampshire), to a high of
$7,560 (in California and South Carolina) (Musumeci and Chidambaram
2019).4 Thus, in order to be Medicaid eligible, someone must have either
arrived at old age without assets or have ‘spent down’ their assets—quite
likely on paid care services—to the low level needed to achieve eligibility.
Moving into a nursing home as a self-pay patient is one way of accomplishing spend-down. One analysis of survey data linked to administrative data
showed that, among community residents not initially enrolled in Medicaid, fewer than three percent were observed to enroll in Medicaid during a
four-year follow-up period if they never moved into a nursing home; meanwhile, 22 percent (20 percent, 19 percent, 17 percent) did transition onto
Medicaid by the end of the follow-up period if they had moved into a nursing home within one year (or 2, 3, or 4 years, respectively) after baseline
(Spillman and Waidmann 2014). The high cost of nursing homes, in other words, provides the means by which many people deplete their financial
assets.
Together, these facts support a somewhat oversimplified characterization
of one form of public-private ‘partnership’ that has arisen to cope with the
intersection of longevity risk with active life, as follows: the private component of risk sharing consists of family caregivers providing needed care
services, protecting insofar as possible their parents’ assets (and, indirectly, their own inheritances), while saving the public the expense of paying
for ‘formal’ care services. Under this approach, the costs that do arise are
borne narrowly by individuals and their families and may even have intergenerational repercussions. The public part of this partnership consists of
the provision of expensive care services, in the community or in a nursing
home, to a population of disabled elders that have been impoverished by
the process of establishing Medicaid eligibility. Those in the latter group
have necessarily outlived whatever assets they once had. Costs are borne
broadly by society through the taxpayer-funded Medicaid program. This
is, at best, a rather haphazard ‘partnership’ (hence the quotation marks
around that word), is one that is not the result of a deliberate design,
and is moreover one with substantial between- (and probably within-) state
variability.
There is limited space in the aforementioned partnership for private
institutions other than families, for example, private long-term care insurance. Indeed, 30 years ago Pauly (1990) showed how nonpurchase of private
insurance was a rational response to (among other things) the availability
of family members as potential providers of care. Rates of private coverage
of this risk continue to be quite low (Brown et al. 2012). Nevertheless, we
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will mention two policy domains that have the potential to alter the terms
of this public-private partnership.

Consumer-directed care
Consumer-directed care refers to an increased role of consumers in managing their own health and health care services. Consumer direction is
believed to improve the quality while lowering the costs of health care
(Buntin et al. 2006). In the area of long-term care, the principal manifestation of this policy idea has been the Cash and Counseling program, which
has been implemented on a limited basis in 15 states (De Milto 2015). In this
program, Medicaid beneficiaries eligible for long-term care services receive
a cash budget with which to purchase services, and the cash can be used to
pay family members to provide at-home care. Because this program operates
as a component of Medicaid, the asset-depletion feature of Medicaid is in
force here, as well. Yet, by allowing payments to family members, Cash and
Counseling could offer a means of reducing some of the costs that would
otherwise be borne by family caregivers.

Paid leave
Paid family caregiving leave provisions may allow some people to receive
‘paid care’ from an employed family member while not requiring that the
benefit—the payment for care services—be conditioned on the depletion
of the care recipient’s assets—i.e. on Medicaid eligibility. While this type of
benefit is both capped and limited in duration, it (like Cash and Counseling
benefits) has at least some potential to offset what would otherwise be a
cost borne by family caregivers; consequently paid caregiving leave has the
potential to change the nature of the public-private partnership that has
arisen with respect to elder care.
As of 2019, eight states plus the District of Columbia had passed laws
mandating the provision of some form of paid family leave by nearly all
private employers (National Partnership for Women and Families 2019).
Because some of these states have relatively large populations, in 2018
nearly 21 percent of total US employment was in the four states that by
then had implemented a paid family leave law; over 28 percent of total
US employment (in 2018) was in states that by 2023 will have implemented their paid family leave program.5 In all cases, these laws require
that paid leave be extended to those providing care to parents as well
as to the parents of newborn children, the more typical target of such
policies.
The first Federal requirement for paid care-related leave emerged
with the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA) and in the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, both of
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which were passed in March 2020. Both bills were enacted in response to
the major and rapidly evolving public health and economic crises associated with the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020. Prior to 2020, Federal policy
governing family caregiving leave for private-sector workers was limited to
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, which mandated the provision
of unpaid leave while exempting those working for small firms and those
who fail to meet length-of-service requirements (Klerman et al. 2014). While
the FFCRA and CARES Act represent a major shift in Federal leave policy, neither is likely—nor are they intended—to alter the extent or costs of
family-provided care to disabled elders: benefits in the new programs are
closely tied to quarantining associated with COVID-19 exposure, or to the
needs of children unable to attend school. Moreover, the programs were
temporary, expiring on December 31, 2020. These initiatives may, however,
prove to be the first step toward a more permanent and widespread Federal
paid-leave mandate.

Conclusion
Longevity risk can be analyzed as either an aggregate or an individual-level
issue. From the aggregate perspective—for example, that adopted by a pension fund manager—an imbalance between the average lifetimes of those
in a covered population and the adequacy of fund reserves appears to be
little altered by consideration of ALE for that population. Individual-level
longevity risk—the prospects for outliving one’s financial assets—is, as well,
of little relevance to the substantial proportion of the population that reaches retirement age with zero or only modest asset levels. For those people, the
problem is one of living on one’s social security benefit rather than worrying
about annuitizing or drawing down one’s savings. Nevertheless, there are
important associations among the three dimensions of remaining lifetime,
one’s level of financial assets, and the experience of disability. The onset of
disability in late life provides a signal about the length of one’s active life (the
individual-level variable of which ALE is a population average); this signal,
in turn, indicates that remaining lifetime will be shorter than expected, or
that care costs will be greater than expected, or both.
Care needs for most people are addressed through the provision of
unpaid care services provided by family members, and this type of care may
preserve one’s assets as well as protect one’s children’s inheritance, albeit
at what might be a substantial cost to the care providers. In the absence
of informal care from family members, or the presence of care needs too
severe to be met by family members, one’s care needs may end up being
publicly financed through Medicaid, but this outcome will generally be
accompanied by the exhaustion of one’s assets—a full-scale realization, in
other words, of longevity risk.
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Notes
1. The annuities market offers a number of additional features and variations on
these basic plans, which for the sake of simplicity I ignore.
2. The two-year sample inclusion is a consequence of the biennial interviewing
design used by the HRS. Thus, respondents age 65 or 66 in 1998 are 67 or 68
in 2000, 69 or 70 in 2002, and so on. The same approach is applied to those
age 65 or 66 in 2000, 2002, or later, but with correspondingly shorter follow-up
periods.
3. The results plotted in Figure 3.5 are admittedly, but to an unknown extent, an
artifact of the functional form and model specification adopted for this purely descriptive analysis. I have not, for example, explored interactions between
age and cumulative experience of disability, both of which are time-varying
covariates.
4. Arizona was the only state not to impose an asset test on seniors and people with
disabilities in 2018.
5. Author’s calculations using the annual Local Area Unemployment Statistics data
from US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2020).
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